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Abstract
Existing literature on franchising has extensively studied the presence of
plural form distribution networks, where two types of vertical relationships
- integration versus franchising - co-exist. However, despite the importance
of monetary provisions in franchise contracts, their definition in the case of
plural form networks had not been addressed.
In this paper, we focus more precisely on the “share parameters” in in-
tegrated (company-owned retail outlet) and decentralized (franchised outlet)
vertical contracts, respectively the commission rate and the royalty rate.
We develop an agency model of payment mechanism in a two-sided moral
hazard context, with one principal and two heterogenous agents distinguished
by di↵erent levels of risk aversion. We define the optimal monetary provi-
sions, and demonstrate that even in the case of segmented markets, with no
correlation between demand shocks, the two rates (commission rate, royalty
rate) are negatively interrelated.
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1 Introduction
This paper deals with the contractual design in franchise networks. Franchising
can be defined as a vertical contractual relationship between two independent firms,
an upstream unit, the franchisor, and a downstream unit, the franchisee. With the
contract, the franchisor allows the franchisee to use his brand name, business format
and know-how, in exchange for compensation, royalties and/or up-front fee. This
organizational form is present in many economic sectors, and widespread interna-
tionally.
Most of the franchised networks are mixed systems where company-owned units
coexist with franchised units1. For example, statistics from the Bond’s guide2 high-
light the predominance of mixed systems in North American franchising (74% in
2014). A similar situation is observed in other countries like Brazil (77% of the
franchised networks in 2012 would be mixed networks, according to the Brazilian
franchising association), France (with 65% of mixed networks in this country, ac-
cording to the the most recent statistics of the National institute of statistics and
economic studies, in 2007), or Venezuela (with 67% of mixed networks in 2012 ac-
cording to the Venezuelan chamber of franchises). In addition, Lafontaine and Shaw
(2005) provided evidence that dual distribution is not a transitory phenomenon, as
the proportion of company-owned outlets remains relatively stable in mature fran-
chised chains.
Consequently, dual distribution is the focus of an important stream of literature,
in economics and strategic management (e.g. Gallini and Lutz, 1992 ; Bai and Tao,
2000 ; Sorenson and Sorensen, 2001 ; Srinivasan, 2006 ; Dant et al., 2008 ; Bu¨rkle
and Posselt, 2008 ; Perrigot et al., 2009 ; Hendrikse and Jiang, 2011 ; Perryman and
Combs, 2012).
Contractual design is another important issue regarding franchising (Lafontaine,
1992 ; Brickley, 2002 ; Vazquez, 2005 ; Gonzalez-Diaz and Solis-Rodriguez, 2012a;
1“Mixed networks”, “plural form” organization or “dual distribution” are used as synonymous
and refer to the simultaneous presence of both franchised and company-owned outlets in the same
network.
2The Bond’s Franchise Guide is the main source of secondary data regarding franchising in the
U.S.A and Canada.
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Maruyama and Yamashita, 2012). Particular attention is paid to the royalty rate.
Indeed, the royalty rate is a determinant monetary provision, defining the “share-
contract”, that is the conditions under which the profit generated by the decentral-
ized vertical structure is shared between the franchisor and the franchisee. For this
reason, this contractual provision plays a central role as incentive device.
However, despite the importance of mixed networks and of monetary devices in
franchise contracts, these subjects are the matter of two separate fields of literature.
The aim of this article is to fill this gap. We provide a model of monetary provisions
in the case of a plural form franchise network.
This paper builds upon Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine (1995)’s model, which re-
mains a central reference in the literature dealing with monetary devices in franchise
contracts. The two authors study formally the franchisor-franchisee relationship as
a two-sided moral hazard problem, and define the optimal contract based on the
royalty rate.
In this theoretical framework, we introduce the assumption of a mixed network.
The incentive problem concerns then two types of agents, the manager of a company-
owned unit and the franchisee. We study how the franchisor can contractually
encourage both types of agents to achieved the best non-observable e↵ort, in a risk
environment associated to the variation of sales at the retail unit level. The agents
are distinguished by di↵erent levels of risk aversion.
In this paper we do not aim at providing an exhaustive theory of the dual system,
but we assume it as given. We consider a situation where a firm has conceived a new
concept. Before delegating part of the business, it has developed his activity through
an integrated retail outlet. Once the product has matured in the market, the firm
becomes a franchisor, delegating part of the retail activity to an independent unit
- the franchisee. Hence, at a certain point of time, the sales of the structure are
undertaken by both company-owned and independent retail units. Within this dual
structure, we are interested by the determination of the optimal monetary provisions.
At this regard, we make use of the agency theory and study an environment where
the volume of sales of each unit is a↵ected by a non-verifiable e↵ort and by a random
component relating to the environmental risk. Since the e↵ort level cannot be made
4
part of the contract, the equilibrium monetary provisions will aim at providing
incentives to the retailing units, and to the franchisor, to exert valuable e↵orts.
We demonstrate that at the equilibrium of monetary provisions regarding the
independent outlet and the company-owned unit - respectively, the royalty rate and
the commission rate - both monetary devices are interdependent and negatively
related.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. After a short literature
review (section 2), we present the formal model (section 3). We then proceed to
the formal analysis (section 4). In order to study the interdependencies between
the rates and how the equilibrium monetary provisions di↵er from optimality, we
begin by introducing a benchmark situation where the provision of e↵ort can be
part of the contract designed by the franchisor. Our conclusion sums up the main
findings and provides suggestions for further research (section 5). All the proofs are
relegated to the appendix section.
2 Related Research
Given that this paper investigates monetary provisions in dual distribution with a
double-sided moral hazard environment, it is related to three streams of literature:
(a) agency theory, and more precisely moral hazard theory of franchising, (b) plural
form distribution networks, (c) contractual design, and more precisely monetary
provisions in franchise contracts.
The first stream of literature is the main theoretical background in the study
of franchising. Indeed, franchising represents a rich context for investigating inter-
organizational precepts and phenomena, due to its particular structure and its be-
havioral aspects. The nature of franchising allows for di↵erent vertical relationships
inside the network. The relevance of agency theory in the study of vertical restraints
is now widely accepted on the basis of initial contributions of Mathewson and Winter
(1984, 1985) and Rey and Tirole (1986a, b). The agency framework has generated
a large amount of literature dealing with franchising (e.g. Lafontaine and Slade,
2007 ; Barthe´le´my, 2011 ; Etro, 2011 ; Gonzalez-Diaz and Solis-Rodriguez, 2012b ;
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Perryman and Combs, 2012).
Agency literature of franchising examines the bilateral contract relationship be-
tween an upstream firm and a retailer within a distribution network. The contract
thus creates an agency relationship because the upstream firm gives the downstream
party a mandate for the commercial exploitation of its brand. The principal (the
upstream firm, i.e. the franchisor) designs the contract, and the retailer may either
accept or reject the contract. Contracts are uniform within the same network; the
analysis refers thus to the representative contract. A moral hazard emerges down-
stream, as the retailers e↵ort a↵ects the profit function of the principal, who cannot
observe this e↵ort. However, franchising being based on renting the upstream firm’s
brand name, a moral hazard can also be considered upstream since retail sales de-
pend on the franchisor’s e↵ort in promoting the brand and network reputation.
The downstream firm (the franchisee) cannot fully observe the e↵ort made by the
franchisor while it su↵ers the consequences.
The second stream includes studies that account for the contract-mix (franchised
and company-owned units) in the same network. Since Caves and Murphy (1976),
capital constraint is a main argument to explain the presence of franchised units in
distribution networks. Franchisees are seen as financial and human capital providers,
enabling a fast and wide development of the network. In addition with the resource-
based view, dual distribution is explained in the framework of agency theory, in
terms of monitoring costs, signaling, or complementarity between the two types of
units.
With the unilateral moral-hazard framework, that is moral hazard on the down-
stream side, an essential determinant of the extent of franchising in the network
is the cost of monitoring the downstream units and maintaining control over the
system. Control cost rises disproportionately with the increasing growth of the sys-
tem, especially into more distant territories. For each new retailer, the upstream
firm faces a choice about the way it will expand the network: company-owned unit
versus independent retailer with a vertical contract as franchising. This choice re-
flects a trade-o↵ between incentive and control. In the moral hazard context, higher
incentives come from independent retailers, but better control is possible with inte-
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grated units. The upstream choice concerning each downstream unit is motivated
by the local conditions regarding the monitoring cost. Thus the contract-mix in the
network is the result of localized decisions. This view finds empirical support in
the econometrical literature on franchising data (Brickley and Dark, 1987 ; Brick-
ley,1999; Arrunada et al., 2001; Barthe´le´my, 2011).
Other interesting explanation of dual distribution is proposed by Gallini and
Lutz (1992) in terms of signal. In a context of information asymmetry relating to
the value of the upstream firm’s brand name, these authors consider two types of
franchisors (good type versus bad type), and demonstrate formally that good type
franchisors can signal their type, and therefore provide relevant information to po-
tential future franchisees. The signal devices are organizational forms that make the
franchisor’s revenue highly dependent upon the performance of the business concept
; like dual distribution. Lafontaine (1993) using US data and the predictions deriv-
ing from Gallini and Lutz (1992)’s seminal theoretical model of signal in franchising
demonstrated that signaling theory is not quite appropriate to study franchising.
Finally, plural form networks are analyzed based on the complementarity be-
tween franchised and company-owned outlets. More than the result of localized
choices relating to monitoring costs, or the result of signaling issues, dual distribu-
tion can be a global strategy of the upstream firm, which maximizes the synergies
between the two types of retail units. In line with this view, Bai and Tao (2000)
adapt the Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991)’s multitask model to study retailing as
a two-task activity requiring i) an e↵ort to maintain the brand name value and ii)
an e↵ort to sale. They argue that franchisees are better in performing the second
task as their revenue depends on sale results, while the managers of company-owned
units have a fixed wage. On the other hand, company-owned units are better in
maintaining the brand value. Drawing thus attention on the complementarities be-
tween the two types of retail units, Bai and Tao (2000) analyze their coexistence in
the network as a strategy which allows the franchisor to take advantage of the spe-
cial feature of each type of unit. Sorenson and Sorensen (2001) support the idea of
complementaries into the dual networks, while Mitsubishi et al. (2008), Perrigot et
al. (2009), Hendrikse and Jiang (2011), show that dual distribution, as a governance
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form, is more e cient than the others.
The third stream of literature considers monetary clauses and more particularly
the share-parameter, that is the royalty rate. As discussed earlier, past research
have focused on pure franchise systems.
In a context of unilateral moral hazard, that is on the franchisee side, the status of
total residual claimant is the most e↵ective incentive mechanism for the downstream
firm. In this case, the share-contract includes an up-front fee and no royalties. Once
the entry fee is paid, the retailer captures the totality of the results of its sale e↵ort.
Yet, royalties are common in distribution contracts. In the agency framework, the
presence of royalties has two justifications. The first one, initially proposed by
Martin (1988), concerns the need to insure the downstream firm against risk, namely,
the hazard on the level of the final demand. Here the share contract defined by the
royalty rate corresponds to a level of risk sharing.
The second justification concerns incentives in the context of bilateral moral
hazard. Then, the franchise contract also has to contain an incentive mechanism for
the upstream firm. The two-sided moral hazard requires ongoing payments to the
franchisor to motivate its e↵orts in promoting the network reputation throughout
the duration of the relationship. This bilateral moral hazard situation is the primary
theoretical justification for profit-sharing contracts in distribution. This theory has
developed since the seminal article of Mathewson and Winter (1985), who proposed
the first formal analysis of franchise agreements in the framework of agency theory.
This notion was augmented by Lal (1990), and by Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine
(1995). The explanation of royalties in terms of bilateral moral hazard finds support
in the econometric literature on franchise data (Lafontaine, 1992; Agrawal and Lal,
1995; Brickley, 2002, Vazquez, 2005).
Our paper targets at conciliating both last presented strands of the literature,
studying optimal monetary provisions in a dual distribution context. Assuming as
given the plural form system, we analyze how those provisions are determined, and
their possible interdependence relationship.
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3 The Model
3.1 Baseline statements
We consider a two-sided moral hazard model of intra-brand competition with an
exogenous downstream market structure, composed by a franchisee, denoted by (f),
and a company-owned unit denoted by (m)3. Territorial exclusivity is a↵orded to
each retail unit. Hence there is no direct interaction between the two outlets. We
further assume that the retailing units are price takers. They can only influence
demand or the volume of sales trough a non verifiable e↵ort. The network organi-
zational structure is represented by Figure 1.
Our objective is to determine the optimal monetary provisions of the system,
more precisely, the optimal royalty and commission rates.
Franchise
Chain
Operated by a
franchisor (p)
Franchise-
Unit
Operated by a
franchisee (f)
Incentives depend on:
· Royalty rate (r)
· Fee (F )
Owned-
Unit
Operated by a
manager (m)
Incentives depend on:
· Commission Rate (y)
· Wage (w)
Figure 1
We model a static game with the following general scheme. First, the principal,
i.e. the franchisor, designs a specific contract for each retail unit. The agents, i.e.
the franchisee and the manager, decide whether or not to accept the contracts. The
game ends if none of them accepts.
3We focus on the “representative” retail units, assuming that if more outlets are present in the
network, all the franchised outlets are similar and all the integrated outlets are similar.
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If the contracts are accepted, all the players, i.e. the principal and the two
agents, provide a non-verifiable e↵ort a↵ecting the volume of sales on the market.
The e↵ort levels are chosen given the contracts that have been signed. However, for
each player, the provided e↵ort level is a free decision since e↵ort is not a contracted
variable. Once e↵orts had been made, the nature determines the sate of the world,
which is defined as a random shock a↵ecting the demand realization in the two
market-segments independently. Finally, the game outcome is achieved and the
payo↵s are executed according to the terms of the contracts.
As the e↵ort levels cannot be part of the contract because they are not observ-
able, and due to the random realization of demand, the franchisor’s problem is to
design a contract providing e↵ort incentives for all the players. The time-schedule
of the game is summarized in Figure 2.
The franchisor
designs the
contract
· Monetary
clauses that
encourage the
agents’ e↵ort
The franchisee
and the manager
· accept
· reject
· End if both
agents do
not accept
the contract
The agents
and the principal
supply non-verifiable
e↵ort
· Double
moral hazard
Nature
determines
the state of
the world
Outcome
and payo↵s
Figure 2
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3.2 Risk and e↵ort issues
We assume that the principal and the agents are risk-averse, with constant risk
aversion. Their utility is expressed by u(I) =   exp( ⇢I), where I denotes the
income and ⇢ is the coe cient of absolute risk aversion. In this context of risk
aversion, the objective of each player is to maximize the certainty equivalent income:
CE = E(I) R (3.1)
where E(·) is the expectation operator and R denotes the risk premium.
Because the franchisor has constant absolute risk aversion, the risk premium
equals:
Rp =
⇢
2
V ar(I) (3.2)
where ⇢ denotes the coe cient of absolute risk aversion, and V ar(I) the vari-
ability of income.
Considering that the franchisee is less risk averse than the manager, in all the
cases, we assume that ⇢m(m) > ⇢f(M), i.e. the minimum manager’s coe cient of risk
aversion is greater than the highest franchisee’s coe cient of risk aversion.
Each retailer sells the franchisor’s products. The franchisor produces at no cost.
We normalize the selling price at 1. To generate sales at the outlet level, each retailer
has to undertake a costly e↵ort e   0. The franchisor’s e↵ort increases sales of both
retail units simultaneously. In addition with the e↵ort of each player, the volume of
sales is a↵ected by a random component ✏, that is a demand shock that none of the
players is able to control. This uncertain environment precludes each player from
inferring the e↵ort levels of the other players from the observed volume of sales and
gives scope to the moral hazard problem.
Sales volumes, respectively for the franchisee and the manager, are then:
Sf (ef , ep) = ↵ef +
 ep
2
+ "f (3.3)
Sm (em, ep) =  em +
 ep
2
+ "m (3.4)
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where ↵,   and   are exogenous demand parameters representing the e↵ort influ-
ence on sales volumes. The sales of each outlet are only a↵ected by the outlet e↵ort
(franchisee or manager’s e↵ort) and by the franchisor’s e↵ort which benefits equally
to both retail units. Hence, we assume that there is no e↵ort externality between the
outlets, while the franchisor’s e↵ort to promote the network works as a public good
in the system. The random variable "j follows a normal distribution "j v N
 
0, ✓2j
 
for j = f,m. In addition, we assume that the cost of e↵ort is increasing, convex,
and the same for all the players:
C(e) =
e2
2
(3.5)
Introducing the cost of e↵ort in equation (3.1), we obtain the certainty equivalent
for each player:
CEi = E(Ii) Ri   e
2
i
2
for i = p,m, f (3.6)
Regarding the parameters of the model, we make the following assumptions that
will be used for the analysis.
Assumption 1. The parameter of lost aversion for the franchisee is such that
⇢f(M)   ⇢f(m) = (⇢f(M)+⇢p)
2
6 >
2
3⇢p.
Assumption 2. The parameter of lost aversion for the manager is such that ⇢m(M) 
⇢m(m) =
(⇢m(M)+⇢p)
2
6 >
2
3⇢p.
In order to ensure an equilibrium, we assume the following:
Assumption 3.
((⇢p + ⇢f(M))✓
2
f +
 
2
+ ↵2)2 = 6(⇢f(M)   ⇢f(m))✓2f (↵2 + ⇢p✓2f  
em
2
 
 
)
Assumption 4.
((⇢p + ⇢m(M))✓
2
m +
 
2
+  2)2 = 6(⇢m(M)   ⇢m(m))✓2m( 2 + ⇢p✓2m  
ef
2
 
↵
)
The aim of the franchisor is to design contracts which incite the agents to make
costly e↵ort maximizing their certainty equivalent.
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As demonstrated by Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine (1995), the analysis can be
restricted to linear contracts without loss of generality. In addition, evidence re-
garding relatively simple and often linear payment rules is rather extensive.
Assumption 5. Contracts have the following form: {F, x}, where F is a fixed
payment and x is an output-based rate.
Using linear contracts, the risk premium for three players is defined as follows:
Rf =
1
2
(r⇢f(M) + (1  r)⇢f(m))V ar((1  r)✓f ) (3.7)
Rm =
1
2
((1  y)⇢m(M) + y⇢m(m))V ar(y✓m) (3.8)
Rp =
⇢p
2
V ar(r✓f + (1  y)✓m) (3.9)
Hence, the risk premium associated with the franchisee depends on the coe cient
of risk aversion, which can vary between the minimum “⇢f(m)” and the maximum
“⇢f(M)”, the percentage of revenue assigned to him (1  r), and the variance in sales
denoted by ✓f . Similarly, the manager’s risk premium depends on the coe cient
of risk aversion, which can vary between “⇢m(m)” and “⇢m(M)”, the percentage of
revenue assigned to him (y), and the variance in sales ✓m. Lastly, the franchisor’s
risk premium (r, (1   y)) is based on the two percentages that he receives, and on
the variance in sales of both retailing units.
By reformulating the equations for the certainty equivalent, we obtain for the
franchisor:
CEp = r
✓
↵ef +
 ep
2
◆
+ (1  y)
✓
 em +
 ep
2
◆
+ F   e
2
p
2
  w
 ⇢p
2
 
r2✓2f + (1  y)2✓2m + 2Cov(✓fr, ✓m(1  y)
 
(3.10)
The first and the second parts of the expression represent the income provided by
the franchisee and by the manager, depending on their e↵ort and on the franchisor’s
e↵ort. The last component is the cost for the franchisor, composed of the risk
premium and the cost of e↵ort.
The certainty equivalent for the franchisee, depending negatively on the royalty
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rate (r), the fixed fee (F ) he has to pay to the franchisor, the risk premium and the
cost of e↵ort, is reformulated as follows:
CEf = (1  r)
✓
↵ef +
 ep
2
◆
  F   e
2
f
2
  1
2
(r⇢f(M) + (1  r)⇢f(m))(1  r)2✓2f (3.11)
Finally, the certainty equivalent for the manager, depending positively on the
wage (w) and the commission rate (y) received from the franchisor, and negatively
on the risk premium and the cost of e↵ort is:
CEm = w + y
✓
 em +
 ep
2
◆
  e
2
m
2
  1
2
((1  y)⇢m(M) + y⇢m(m))y2✓2m) (3.12)
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4 Analysis
4.1 The franchisor’s problem
In franchise systems, the franchisor is typically responsible for promoting the chain.
Franchisees and managers are responsible for managing the outlets on a day-to-
day basis. The downstream and upstream e↵orts a↵ect the outlet performance.
However, the e↵ort levels are not easily monitored.
On this basis, the franchisor’s problem can be expressed as follows:
Max[r,y,w,F,ep]CEp = r
✓
↵ef +
 ep
2
◆
+ F| {z }
Income from franchised unit
+(1  y)
✓
 em +
 ep
2
◆
  w| {z }
Income from company-owned unit
  e
2
p
2|{z}
Cost
  ⇢p
2
V ar(r✓f + (1  y)✓m)| {z }
Franchisor’s risk aversion
,
subject to:
(i) CEm = w + y
✓
 em +
 ep
2
◆
  e
2
m
2
  1
2
((1  y)⇢m(M) + y⇢m(m))y2✓2m   0 (IRm)
(ii) CEf = (1  r)
✓
↵ef +
 ep
2
◆
  F   e
2
f
2
  1
2
(r⇢f(M) + (1  r)⇢f(m))(1  r)2✓2f   0 (IRf )
(iii)
d (CEp)
dep
= r
 
2
+ (1  y) 
2
  ep = 0 (ICp)
(iv)
d (CEf)
def
= (1  r)↵  ef = 0 (ICf )
(v)
d (CEm)
dem
= y    em = 0 (ICm)
Conditions (i) and (ii) are the participation constraints. These conditions must
be met for the manager and the franchisee accept the contracts. We normalize to
zero the outside option of both agents. The last three conditions are the incen-
tive constraints a↵ecting the e↵ort levels. Since e↵ort variables in the model are
continuous, we use the first-order approach.
In the following, we focus first on the case of symmetric information, to highlight
in a second step the specific features of the case with asymmetric information.
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4.2 Case 1: Symmetric information
In case of symmetric information, i.e. when all the players have the same informa-
tion, both before establishing the contract and during the relationship, e↵orts are
observable and contractable. Then, the optimal monetary provisions depends only
on risk aversions, as expressed by proposition 1:
Proposition 1. When all relevant information is verifiable, optimal monetary pro-
visions depend only on the degree of risk aversion of the players. Thus,
r⇤ = 1 
s
2⇢p
3(⇢f(M)   ⇢f(m)) y
⇤ =
s
2⇢p
3(⇢m(M)   ⇢m(m))
Because the e↵ort level is part of the contract designed by the franchisor, the
distribution of risk between the players depends only on the relative absolute risk
aversions. Then, optimality requires that lower is the risk aversion of a player,
compared to the others, higher is the risk he bears. Since in the specific case of
symmetric information, there is no need to provide incentives to induce e↵ort, the
franchisor’s maximization problem is only based on the participation constraints
(Appendix A).
The royalty and commission rates act as insurance devices. If the franchisor’s
risk aversion increases, he will prefer a safer payment mechanism to extract the
surplus of the franchised unit. Therefore, he will set a higher up-front fee and a
lower royalty rate, as the rate depends on uncertain sales. In addition, to extract
income from the company-owned unit, the franchisor will prefer to pay a lower wage
with a higher commission rate. If the franchisee’s risk aversion increases, he will
prefer a payment mechanism based on a higher royalty rate and a lower up-front
fee. This is a way to share with the franchisor the risk related to sales. Finally, if the
manager’s risk aversion increases, he will prefer a higher fixed wage in addition with
a lower commission rate related to the uncertain sales on the downstream market.
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4.3 Case 2: Asymmetric information
We focus now on the case where e↵orts are not observable and they can not be part of
the contracts. In this case, our game is subject to moral hazards, and the contracts
designed by the franchisor have to provide incentives in order to promote the three
players’ e↵ort. The correlation between the events of the two segment-market is set
at zero4.
In this case, the optimal monetary provisions do not only depend on the relative
risk aversions, and have to vary according to the obtained outputs. Therefore, the
franchisor’s maximization problem depends now on the participation and on and
the incentive constraints (Appendix B). We obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 2. With non contractible e↵orts and uncorrelated events Cov(✓f , ✓m) =
0, the monetary provisions are interdependent, negatively related, and equal to:
r⇤ = 1 
vuut2(↵2 + ⇢p✓2f   em 2  )
3(⇢f(M)   ⇢f(m))✓2f
y⇤ =
s
2( 2 + ⇢p✓2m   ef  2↵ )
3(⇢m(M)   ⇢m(m))✓2m
As in the previous case, the royalty and commission rates depend on the relative
absolute risk aversion of the three players. However, because of the bilateral moral
hazard, they now depend also on the e↵orts provided by the agents and by the
franchisor.
Thus, if the manager’s e↵ort generates more sales, the principal must incite this
e↵ort with a higher commission rate. The same reasoning applies for the franchisee.
In this case, the incentive mechanism is a reduction of the royalty rate. Finally,
the incentive devices for the franchisor’s e↵ort are a higher royalty rate and a lower
commission rate. This generates an ine cient distribution of risk, but allows for
promoting incentives for the players to make greater e↵ort.
An interesting result is that the monetary provisions are interrelated, even if the
demand shocks on the segment markets are not correlated. This result is explained
by the franchisor’s e↵ort, acting as a public good for both retailing units5.
4This implies that:
Rp =
⇢p
2 V ar(r✓f+(1 y)✓m) = ⇢p2 (r2✓2f+(1 y)2✓2m+2Cov(✓fr, ✓m(1 y)) y Cov(✓fr, ✓m(1 y)) = 0
5Complementary results available upon request show that with correlated events Cov(✓f , ✓m) 6=
0, the optimal provisions are interdependent but higher than in the case with no correlation.
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5 Conclusion
Existing literature on franchising has extensively studied the presence of mixed
distribution networks. However, despite the importance of monetary provisions in
franchise contracts, their definition in the case of plural form networks had not been
addressed.
In this paper, we focus more precisely on the “share parameters” in integrated
(company-owned retail outlet) and decentralized (franchised outlet) vertical rela-
tionships, respectively the commission rate and the royalty rate.
We develop an agency model of payment mechanism in a two-sided moral hazard
context, with one principal and two heterogenous agents distinguished by di↵erent
levels of risk aversion. We define the optimal monetary provisions, and demonstrate
that even in the case of segmented markets, with no correlation between demand
shocks, the two rates (commission rate, royalty rate) are negatively interrelated.
Two limitations of the model can provide avenues for future research. First, the
market structure of our model is exogenous. The contractual choices are thus studied
independently of the organizational choices. Yet, for example, the mix level in the
network, that is the proportion of company-owned retail units, may influence the
payment mechanisms. Second, we assume here that there is no externality between
the retail outlet e↵orts. However, demand interdependencies coming from the e↵ort
provided by the di↵erent retail units may influence the determination of monetary
provisions in distribution contracts.
We anticipate that future research will benefit and hopefully build on the ap-
proach presented in this paper.
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6 Appendices
6.1 Appendix A
Proof of proposition (1): We consider here a context of symmetric information
where e↵ort is observable and can be part of the contract o↵ered by the franchisor.
In this case, the reduced problem is as follows:
Max[r,y,w,F,ep,ef ,em]CEp = r
✓
↵ef +
 ep
2
◆
+ F| {z }
Income from franchised unit
+(1  y)
✓
 em +
 ep
2
◆
  w| {z }
Income from company-owned unit
  e
2
p
2|{z}
Cost
  ⇢p
2
 
r2✓2f + (1  y)2✓2m + 2Cov(✓fr, ✓m(1  y))
 | {z }
Franchisor’s risk aversion
,
subject to:
(i) CEm = w + y
✓
 em +
 ep
2
◆
  e
2
m
2
  1
2
((1  y)⇢m(M) + y⇢m(m))y2✓2m   0 (IRm)
(ii) CEf = (1  r)
✓
↵ef +
 ep
2
◆
  F   e
2
f
2
  1
2
(r⇢f(M) + (1  r)⇢f(m))(1  r)2✓2f   0 (IRf )
The Lagrangian of the problem is:
◆ = r
⇣
↵ef +
 ep
2
⌘
+ (1  y)
⇣
 em +
 ep
2
⌘
+ F   e2p2   w   ⇢p2
 
r2✓2f + (1  y)2✓2m
 
  1
⇣
e2m
2 +
1
2((1  y)⇢m(M) + y⇢m(m))y2✓2m   w   y
⇣
 em +
 ep
2
⌘⌘
  2
⇣
F +
e2f
2 +
1
2(r⇢f(M) + (1  r)⇢f(m))(1  r)2✓2f   (1  r)
⇣
↵ef +
 ep
2
⌘⌘
.
We then proceed to calculate the first order conditions of the Lagrangian.
With respect to wages and to the up-front fee, we obtain respectively:
 1 = 1, (6.1)
 2 = 1 (6.2)
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With respect to both Lagrange multipliers, we get the following conditions:
w + y
✓
 em +
 ep
2
◆
  e
2
m
2
  ((1  y)⇢m(M) + y⇢m(m))y
2✓2m
2
= 0 (6.3)
(1  r)
✓
↵ef +
 ep
2
◆
  F   e
2
f
2
  (r⇢f(M) + (1  r)⇢f(m))
(1  r)2✓2f
2
= 0 (6.4)
Therefore, the franchisee’s and manager’s individual rationality constraint must
be binding, which implies that there is no rent left downstream. By calculating the
first-order condition of the Lagrangian with respect to the e↵ort of the principal we
obtain:
r
 
2
+ (1  y) 
2
  ep    1
✓
 y  
2
◆
   2
✓
 (1  r) 
2
◆
= 0 (6.5)
and substituting by equations (6.1) and (6.2) into (6.5), we get:
r
 
2
+
 
2
  y  
2
  ep + y  
2
+
 
2
   
2
r = 0! ep =  
This expression indicates that the e↵ort of the franchisor is such that the marginal
cost equals the marginal benefit. This last e↵ect is represented by the e↵ectiveness
that the e↵ort has on the demand to both units. By the same procedure, we obtain
that the e↵ort for the manager and the franchisee are equal to:
em =  ; ef = ↵
Regarding the first order condition with respect to the royalty rate we obtain:
↵ef +
 ep
2
  ⇢p✓2fr
  2
✓
1
2
(⇢f(M)   ⇢f(m))(1  r)2✓2f   (r⇢f(M) + (1  r)⇢f(m))(1  r)✓2f + ↵ef +
 ep
2
◆
= 0
Substituting with the expressions obtained previously, we get:
3(⇢f(M)   ⇢f(m))(1  r)2   2(⇢f(M) + ⇢p)(1  r) + 2⇢p = 0 (6.6)
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In accordance with Assumption 1, we know that ⇢f(M)   ⇢f(m) = (⇢f(M)+⇢p)
2
6 , then⇣q
3(⇢f(M)   ⇢f(m))(1  r) 
p
2⇢p
⌘2
= 0 (6.7)
Therefore,
r⇤ = 1 
s
2⇢p
3(⇢f(M)   ⇢f(m)) (6.8)
The same calculations are applied for the commission rate.
We get:
 ( em +  ep
2
) + ⇢p(1  y)✓2m
  1
✓
1
2
( ⇢m(M) + ⇢m(m))(y2✓2m) + ((1  y)⇢m(M) + y⇢m(m))y✓2m   ( em +
 ep
2
)
◆
= 0
3(⇢m(M)   ⇢m(m))y2   2(⇢m(M) + ⇢p)y + 2⇢p = 0 (6.9)
In accordance with Assumption 2, we know that ⇢m(M)   ⇢m(m) = (⇢m(M)+⇢p)
2
6 , then⇣q
3(⇢m(M)   ⇢m(m))y  
p
2⇢p
⌘2
= 0 (6.10)
Hence
y =
s
2⇢p
3(⇢m(M)   ⇢m(m)) (6.11)
⇤
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6.2 Appendix B
Proof of proposition (2): We consider here a context of two-sided moral hazard,
where e↵orts are not observable and cannot be part of the contract. The reduced
problem is similar to case 1, but we introduce now the incentive constraints:
(iii)
d (CEp)
dep
= r
 
2
+ (1  y) 
2
  ep = 0 (ICp)
(iv)
d (CEf)
def
= (1  r)↵  ef = 0 (ICf )
(v)
d (CEm)
dem
= y    em = 0 (ICm)
We first characterize the monetary provisions, before proving points i) and ii) of
proposition 2.
The Lagrangian is equal to:
◆ = r
⇣
↵ef +
 ep
2
⌘
+ (1  y)
⇣
 em +
 ep
2
⌘
+ F   e2p2   w   ⇢p2
 
r2✓2f + (1  y)2✓2m
 
  1
⇣
e2m
2 +
1
2((1  y)⇢m(M) + y⇢m(m))y2✓2m   w   y
⇣
 em +
 ep
2
⌘⌘
  2
⇣
F +
e2f
2 +
1
2(r⇢f(M) + (1  r)⇢f(m))(1  r)2✓2f   (1  r)
⇣
↵ef +
 ep
2
⌘⌘
  3
 
(ep   r  2   (1  y)  2
    4 (ef   (1  r)↵)   5(em   y ) .
We then proceed to calculate the first order conditions of the Lagrangian.With
respect to wages and to the up-front fee, we obtain respectively:
 1 = 1 (6.12)
 2 = 1 (6.13)
With respect to all Lagrange multipliers, we get the following conditions:
w + y( em +
 ep
2
)  e
2
m
2
  1
2
((1  y)⇢m(M) + y⇢m(m))y2✓2m = 0 (6.14)
(1  r)(↵ef +  ep
2
)  F   e
2
f
2
  1
2
(r⇢f(M) + (1  r)⇢f(m))(1  r)2✓2f = 0 (6.15)
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Therefore, the franchisee’s and manager’s individual rationality constraint must
be binding, which implies that there is no rent left downstream.
(r + (1  y)) ep
2
= ep (6.16)
(1  r)↵ = ef (6.17)
y  = em (6.18)
The e↵ort provided by each agent and by the principal is equal to their incentives
and to the impact of their e↵ort on the downstream sales. By calculating the first-
order condition of the Lagrangian with respect to the e↵ort of the principal we
obtain
r
 
2
+ (1  y) 
2
  ep    1
✓
 y  
2
◆
   2
✓
 (1  r) 
2
◆
   3 = 0 (6.19)
Substituting by equations (6.12) and (6.13) and (iii) into (6.19), we get:
 3 =
 
2
(y   r + 1) (6.20)
The Lagrangian with respect to the manager’s e↵ort indicates that:
(1  y)     1(em   y )   5 = 0 (6.21)
Substituting equation (6.12) into (6.21), we get:
 5 =  (1  y) (6.22)
From the Lagrangian with respect to the franchisee’s e↵ort we get:
r↵   2(ef   (1  r)↵)   4 = 0 (6.23)
Substituting equation (6.13) and (iv) into (6.23), we obtain:
 4 = r↵ (6.24)
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Regarding the first order condition with respect to the royalty rate we obtain:
↵ef +
 ep
2
  ⇢pr✓2f +  3
 
2
   4↵ (6.25)
  2
✓
1
2
(⇢f(M)   ⇢f(m))(1  r)2✓2f   (r⇢f(M) + (1  r)⇢f(m))(1  r)2✓2f + ↵ef +
 ep
2
◆
= 0
Substituting equation (6.13), (6.20) and (6.24) into (6.25), we get:
 r(⇢p✓2f +
 
2
+ ↵2)  1
2
(⇢f(M)   ⇢f(m))(1  r)2✓2f
+(r⇢f(M) + (1  r)⇢f(m))(1  r)✓2f + (y + 1)
 
2
= 0
Then:
3(⇢f(M) ⇢f(m))(1 r)2 2(⇢p✓2f +
 
2
+↵2+⇢f(M)✓
2
f )(1 r)+2( y
 
2
+⇢p✓
2
f +↵
2) = 0
(6.26)
Substituting equation (6.18) into (6.26), in accordance with Assumption 3, we get:
r⇤ = 1 
vuut2(↵2 + ⇢p✓2f   em2    )
3(⇢f(M)   ⇢f(m))✓2f
(6.27)
The same calculations are applied for the commission rate.
We get:
 ( em +  ep
2
) + ⇢p(1  y)✓2m    3
 
2
+  5  (6.28)
  1
✓
1
2
( ⇢m(M) + ⇢m(m))y2✓2m + ((1  y)⇢m(M) + y⇢m(m))y✓2m    em  
 ep
2
◆
= 0
Substituting equation (6.17) into (6.28), in accordance with Assumption 4, we ob-
tain:
y⇤ =
s
2( 2 + ⇢p✓2m   ef2  ↵)
3(⇢m(M)   ⇢m(m))✓2m
(6.29)
⇤
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6.3 Appendix C
Summary results - Comparative statics for di↵erent fundaments of the
economy:
Variable
Symmetric Asymmetric
Information Information
⇢f " r " r "
⇢p " r # r #
⇢m " (1  y) " (1  y) "
⇢p " (1  y) # (1  y) #
  " r "
  " (1  y) "
↵ " r #
  " (1  y) #
r " (1  y) #
(1  y) " r #
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